Ancient Graeco-Roman Philosophy

My dissertation examined Aristotle’s proof of the nonexistence of void in Physics Book IV, chapters 6-9. Aristotle's verdict that void cannot exist would go on to dominate scientific thinking on void for two millennia—perhaps to the detriment of that thought. Yet not to its detriment was Aristotle’s understanding of what void is: space deprived of body. In many ways our current perspective on void, space deprived of as much energy as possible, is a remote descendant of Aristotle’s own answer to what void is. My dissertation looked at what Aristotle thinks void is and the arguments he uses to prove that such a thing cannot exist. I also addressed the prior questions: how can Aristotle say what void is, given that he does not think it exists? And how can Aristotle prove nonexistence, given that his logic employs only non-empty terms, and void would be an empty term? The scholarship had not examined how Aristotle can by his own lights prove the negative existential claim, void does not exist, which would be so influential in the history of science. My dissertation sought to do this

“Aristotle does not present Atomist arguments for void at Physics IV.6, 213b2–22”

Forthcoming, Ancient Philosophy

According to the orthodox interpretation of Physics iv 6.213b2-22, Aristotle there presents arguments for the existence of void offered by the Atomists. This interpretation is incorrect. I show that Aristotle does not take himself to be outlining at 213b2-22 what were offered as arguments for void. I then suggest that the Atomists would not have offered the arguments that the orthodox interpretation takes 213b2-22 to be anyway.

A paper on Aristotle’s account of what void is

Under review

Prior to arguing against the existence of void in Physics IV.6–9, Aristotle offers an answer to what void is: place deprived of body. His refutations then target two different sorts of void, separated and inseparable voids. It is unsolved in Aristotelian scholarship what these two sorts of void are. This paper offers an interpretation. I find that the distinction between voids is philosophically rich and bears explanatory potential in a way unrecognized by studies on ancient void theory. Indeed, if my interpretation is correct, the distinction may be prescient, anticipating Newton’s own distinction between relative and absolute inertial frames two millennia later

A paper on how Aristotle proves a negative existential

Under review

I examine Aristotle’s inquiry on void in Physics IV 6-9 and find that Aristotle has a considered method for proving nonexistence claims. I find that this method for proving nonexistence is a counterpart of the method for proving existence that Aristotle outlines in Posterior Analytics II 1-2. I find that (i) Aristotle has considered grounds for saying what a nonexistent thing like void is or would be, and (ii) Aristotle can demonstrate the nonexistence of something using his own logic without violating the existence entailments of that logic.

Feminist philosophy

A paper on pornography as misinformation

Under review

I develop an argument for thinking that pornography is misinformation. Pornography can and does transmit false descriptive beliefs about what is safe in or typical of sex. I grant that pornography is fiction and offer an apparatus for determining when a fiction makes an assertion-like move. I show that pornography makes many such assertion-like movess. I then show that the epistemic environment for information on the mechanics of sex is poor, such that people are likely to form and retain false beliefs on the basis of pornography. Because the beliefs that pornography invites us to form bear a systematic connection to real physical harms, the misinformation in pornography is a public health problem. This paper has normative consequences for the role that Big Tech plays in moderating misinformation online. I offer a harm mitigation strategy that even the liberal defender of pornography should accept. Just as we take platforms like Facebook and Twitter to be morally justified in flagging misinformation on their platforms, so too should we think that pornography platforms like Pornhub would be morally justified in flagging misinformation. Indeed, if we think that the former are morally obligated to do so, then so too should we think this about the latter.

A paper on Vasubandhu on ākāśa

In progress

I examine Vasubandhu’s treatment of space (ākāśa) in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. There Vashubandhu references an Abhidharma view that space is “unconditioned” (asaṃskṛta) and a “neutral dharma” (avyākṛta). Vasubandhu further cites what he calls “elementary space” (ākāśadhātu), which he claims differs from space itself (ākāśa). What is this further space, and how does it differ from space itself? Still more perplexingly, he references a belief in empty space (chidra), which is likened to matter (rūpa). But if “empty space” is space itself that is empty, and if space is uncaused by change or the material world, as “unconditioned” suggests, then in what way could empty space be matter? I make sense of these seemingly disparate claims and argue that Vasubandhu has a unified account of space.

Indian Philosophy

Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

A project on an Aristotelian ethics of AI

In progress

I aim to propose an ethical framework for approaching certain challenges that artificial intelligence poses to human flourishing. The proposed framework has its basis in ancient Aristotelian ethics. According to Aristotle, human flourishing consists in performing activities that fulfil our distinctively human capacities. For instance, as social creatures humans have distinctive capacities for maintaining relationships. When we fulfil these by actively maintaining relationships, we flourish in this respect. So too, humans have capacities for reasoning about mathematics and justice. When we fulfil these by doing mathematics or reasoning about justice, we flourish in these respects. Because flourishing consists precisely in performing such activities, if we outsource their performance to artificial intelligence, we omit the activities constitutive of a good life. Whatever benefits the use of artificial intelligence offer us, these must be weighed against the possibility that such use deprives us of the very activities that make human life worthwhile.